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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3165 
___________ 
 
MARVIN CONROY DAVIS, 
      Petitioner 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
          Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A089-394-769) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Andrew R. Arthur 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 10, 2014 
Before:  SMITH, GARTH and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 14, 2014 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Marvin Davis is a citizen of Jamaica.  In 2008, he was indicted in Richmond, 
Virginia, on one count of possessing with intent to sell, give, or distribute more than five 
pounds of marijuana, in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-248.1.  R. 116.  He was found 
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guilty of that offense and received a five-year (but partially suspended) sentence of 
incarceration.  R. 117. 
 In 2012, the Government charged Davis as removable for having been convicted 
of an aggravated felony (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) and a controlled substance 
offense (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)).  Proceeding pro se before an Immigration Judge 
(“IJ”), Davis argued that his offense should not be considered an aggravated felony.  The 
IJ concluded to the contrary and ruled that Davis was removable on both charged 
grounds.  See R. 47 (controlled substance); R. 47–51 (aggravated felony). 
 Davis appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  The BIA ruled that 
there was no “reversible error in the [IJ’s] determination that [Davis] is removable based 
on his aggravated felony conviction” and dismissed the appeal.1  R. 3.   
 Davis presents a petition for review.  His main argument is that he was not 
convicted of an aggravated felony.  He also takes issue with the agency’s use and 
application of the modified categorical approach in his case.  In addition to opposing 
Davis’s petition, the Government moves to dismiss it, asserting that we lack jurisdiction 
over the case because Davis is removable as a criminal alien.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(C).       
                                              
1
 We note that a sentence on the first page of the BIA’s decision is incomplete, and it is 
not clear if the copy in the certified record is missing some background information that 
is in the original.  R. 2-3.  However, Davis does not raise the issue, and any omission 
does not, in any event, affect our ability to review the case because the BIA’s legal 
analysis begins later in the decision.   
 3 
 
 Because the basis for Davis’s removal is his conviction for an aggravated felony, 
our jurisdiction is limited by the REAL ID Act; however, we retain jurisdiction over 
constitutional claims and questions of law.  See Pierre v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 528 F.3d 
180, 184 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D)); see also Silva-
Rengifo v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 473 F.3d 58, 63 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Kamara v. Att’y 
Gen. of the U.S., 420 F.3d 202, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2005), for the proposition that the 
“jurisdictional grant regarding appeals by aggravated felons extends not just to legal 
determinations but also to application of law to facts”).  Despite the Government’s 
argument to the contrary in its motion, Davis does raise questions of law, such as his 
claim that he was not convicted of an aggravated felony. 
 We reject his arguments, however.  The statute under which Davis was convicted, 
Va. Code § 18.2-248.1, is a divisible statute, so the agency properly utilized the modified 
categorical approach.  See Garcia v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 462 F.3d 287, 293 & n.9 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  The BIA determined from the evidence in the record (R. 116-18), see 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.41; Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013) (describing the 
type of documents that may be considered), that Davis was charged with and convicted of 
the “more than five pounds” version of the statute, see Va. Code § 18.2-248.1(3).  The 
BIA then “compare[d] the offense of conviction to the federal Controlled Substances Act 
to determine if it [wa]s analogous to an offense under that Act.”  Borrome v. Att’y Gen. 
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of the U.S., 687 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Meanwhile, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D) would attach a maximum five-year sentence to the 
conduct.  Cf. Evanson v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 550 F.3d 284, 289 (3d Cir. 2008). 
And, as the BIA noted, we have held that 120.5 grams is not a “small amount” of 
marijuana that would escape the felony definition, see Catwell v. Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 
199, 209 (3d Cir. 2010); it therefore follows that an amount in excess of 2.2 kilograms 
would not either.   
 For these reasons and otherwise, Davis’s challenge to the BIA’s decision is 
without merit.  We deny his petition for review.
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 We also deny the Government’s motion to dismiss the petition.   
